Negotiating on Iran
Wednesday, 09 Jan 2008 12:53
The Bushehr nuclear plant under construction in Iran
Iran In Focus
As another round of sanctions are imposed, Iran's row with the rest of the world shows no signs of going away. Full Story
Convincing the world to avoid military action against Iran's nuclear programme is a nervy business.
The problem
Iran has repeatedly denied allegations from the international community it is seeking to develop an atomic bomb. Its proud president has defied UN sanctions and welcomed growing isolation on the issue, frustrating those determined to deny Tehran a nuclear capability. At their darkest moments western states have threatened military action against Iranian nuclear plans. Some fear such a step could prove "disastrous" to prospects for peace around the world.
The person
That, at least, is the view of Alex Brigham, the Foreign Police Centre's (FPC) spokesperson on Iran. His organisation seeks to influence the UK's stances on a variety of issues, having been set up by Robin Cook to advance Labour's ethical foreign policy agenda ten years ago. The FPC provides an alternative to establishment thinking on China, Iraq, the Middle East, Africa and other areas. On Iran, Mr Brigham publishes reports and holds meetings and events, all seeking to influence the Foreign Office's stance on the issue.
A watery prelude
Mr Brigham's personal agenda is solely focused on UK-Iran relations, which took their biggest bilateral knock of the year in spring 2007. Iranian Revolutionary Guards (RG) members captured eight Royal Navy Marines and seven sailors on the Shatt al-Arab waterway on March 23rd. They were not released until April 4th, in what became a major diplomatic incident.
"In the short term it looked pretty bleak," Mr Brigham remembers.
"There was a temptation on the American side to offer fly-pasts, threaten bombing raids or some sort of rescue operation but I think the softly-softly approach to talk to various people in Iran worked," he says.
Diplomatic efforts to talk to Tehran appeared to patch up the differences, Mr Brigham believes, with the chance to blame the renegade RG proving a handy get-out clause for both sides.
"In a sense it slightly got forgotten because it was peacefully resolved and other events overtook them," he adds.
The main event
Attention quickly returned to Iran's primary clash with the rest of the world – its nuclear plans. After sanctions were heightened at the UN in March the US introduced its own economic sanctions in October, ostensibly exclusively over Iranian support for terrorism in Iraq. Then Mr Ahmadinejad replaced his chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani with Saeed Jalili, who is "less willing to negotiate" in Mr Brigham's eyes.
The negative implications of that appointment disappeared, at least in the short-term, following the publication of the latest US national intelligence estimate (NIE). In an apparent U-turn the report stated there was no evidence of Iran pursuing a nuclear weapons programme beyond 2003. Iran hailed the NIE a "victory".
"It was quite a surprise to see what many people had been saying about Iran confirmed by the NIE report – quite a change from the run-up to the Iraq war," Mr Brigham said.
While he believes the report is a blow to those in the White House seeking military action before Mr Bush's exit in early 2009, Mr Brigham believes its impact in diplomatic terms is less clear.
The problem is "belligerent" Mr Ahmadinejad. Although most Iranians understand the arguments behind their country's calls for independent nuclear power – the double standards regarding Pakistan and India, for example – not all approve of his defiant style.
Mr Brigham describes Iranian domestic politics as "very complicated", saying "it's very difficult to establish the truth" about the changing dynamics between Iran's many power bases. As well as the conservative-moderate camps there are tensions between the religious and secular, the children of the 1979 revolution and the veterans of the Iran-Iraq war.
Mr Ahmadinejad walks the tightrope between all of these, but his "no-holds barred" approach furrows the brow of even the more conservative elements of Iranian politics. He has a "complex relationship" with Iran's clerics, too, portraying himself as a "messianic figure" at times, but Mr Brigham believes he will be able to maintain Iran's standpoint throughout the rest of Mr Bush's presidency.
How will the international community respond to this perceived threat?
Best case scenario
For Mr Brigham, "not very much happening" in 2008 would be a positive result. He hopes the Americans might engage in direct negotiations but fears that is unlikely, meaning it will be left to the Europeans to persevere with Mr Jalili. A Democrat president may offer better prospects for progress through talks.
Worst case scenario
Assuming a lack of prima facie evidence showing Iran's intent to build a nuclear weapon, Mr Brigham envisages an "almighty battle at the UN" followed by an Iraq-style US-led coalition taking shape.
The consequences of such a turn of events would be very difficult not just for Britain but for the wider world, he warns.
Although Iran's nuclear technology would be put back by ten years, the programme could be restarted and much of the technology would remain intact.
"Iran could leave the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, there could be all kinds of retaliatory measures against Israel or against coalition troops in Iraq or Afghanistan.
"Other economic effects are also possible - oil prices skyrocketing even more, and other effects on the global economy. It could potentially be pretty disastrous."
Slow-burning diplomacy
Mr Brigham's organisation tries to convince the Foreign Office that avoiding such a situation is the best course of action. Fortunately he describes the government's position as "broadly in the right position at the moment", showing no willingness or enthusiasm for a strike against Iran.
Instead the tentative, diplomatic approach, as employed during the 2007 captured-sailors crisis, seems to be the preferred approach in the establishment and among politicians.
"Underground there is a greater preparedness to reach out to more moderate elements in Iran - I think that could be a positive thing."
Measuring success in such an atmosphere is difficult. Like all those working in international affairs assessing progress is almost impossible; a shrug is the only way forward when dealing with such intangibles.
"Even when you get a good result and your position has been taken on board by the government it's hard to know whether you're just being prescient and predicting something that would have happened anyway," he muses.
Alex Stevenson