Pakistan News Story

05 December 2008 10:39 BST

Pakistan's tribal problem

It's a warm day in central London – but that's not the reason Pakistan's foreign minister is getting hot under the collar.

Shah Mahmood Qureshi seems somewhat prickly. He is upset with the Afghan government for "accusatory" statements about Pakistan's intentions on their mutual border. Worse than that, it seems, is pressure coming from the rest of the international community.

"States are sensitive to their sovereignty and expect to be treated with respect," he told an audience at the International Institute for Strategic Studies last week. "It is only through mutual respect that inter-state relations can be nourished."

What is Mr Qureshi's problem? Put simply, the Taliban. Pakistan is refusing to allow foreign troops on to its soil to deal with the tribal areas which harbour the fighters. But frustration is growing among coalition forces in Afghanistan that they cannot defeat the Taliban because of its safe havens in Pakistan's federally administered tribal areas (Fata). Over seven years have passed since the Taliban were ousted from Kabul in November 2001. The job is not yet finished and growing numbers are beginning to believe it may be here, in the wild rugged terrain of the border region, that the answer lies.

Andy Hull, senior research fellow on international and security issues at the Institute for Public Policy thinktank, is uncompromising about the level of the problem. He describes Pakistan's tribal belt, in no uncertain terms, as "the epicentre of global terrorism".

"Al-Qaida exploits ungoverned or poorly governed space," he explained.

"The Fata, a short border-crossing south of the Tora Bora cave complex where Osama bin Laden once hid, are now a primary locus for terrorist training and a haven for neo-jihadis. There, amongst the Pashtun tribespeople, the Taliban find support, madrassas proliferate, and Islamist political power grows."

Islamabad is placed in a difficult position as a result. There are 40,000 daily crossings on the border, most of which are unavoidable. Divided families and villages make this inevitable and regulation is difficult. Pakistan wants to establish more regulation through stickers on vehicles and biometric ID cards. Afghanistan, Mr Qureshi says, is dragging its feet. "We feel that the effort on the other side is somewhat lacking," he says.

The porous border is being used by militants as a place to retreat and regroup – and commanders are getting frustrated. For if the border cannot be sealed through the normal measures, many believe other action needs to be taken. Pakistan's government may be entering a new era of democracy, with the opposition Pakistan People's party (PPP) taking office after the political crisis which led to its leader Benazir Bhutto's assassination, but its policy towards Fata remains unchangingly against such a stance. A full-scale "invasion" of Fata would be "counterproductive".

It's the hearts and minds of the civilian population there that need to be taken into account, Mr Qureshi insists. Poverty, economic deprivation, illiteracy and denial of rights are all predominant in an area which has been largely left to its own devices for decades. Pakistan has to develop a "complex strategy" to tackle the issue.

"We have to reach out to them so we can… isolate the hardcore element. The socioeconomic development of that area is very important. We have to address issues of social uplift. Yes, you have to use force – but only as a last resort."

Some are unconvinced by this line of reasoning. Fraser Nelson in the Spectator even accuses the Pakistani government of engaging in a "dangerous double game" on the issue. He claims many believe the Pakistani government, army and intelligence services all have their own reasons for prevaricating.

Mr Qureshi addressed such concerns head on, pleading for trust from his allies. It's a basic message – that the menace of terrorism "is our concern as much as it is yours" and that Islamabad is "very serious in dealing with this extremist terrorist element".

"Begin to trust us. Believe what we're saying. We will continue to cooperate with our allies" he said.

That cooperation is, however, tainted by tensions. Western troops, particularly from the US, have been blamed for a string of missile attacks on Pakistani territory. Earlier today a strike killed six people in Azam Warsak, South Waziristan; it was not immediately clear who was responsible but many point the finger at the Americans. Mr Quereshi's comments are laced with subtexts relating to a history of uneasy relations between the two countries.

George Bush speaks to the press after hosting Pakistani prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani at the White House



"You have to understand some of the history," Marie Lall, an associate fellow on Chatham House's Asia programme, said. The US backed the Afghans' struggle against the occupying Soviets during the 1980s. Their presence led to radicalisation in the border areas but succeeded in supporting the mujahideen insurgency. Their mistake was a quick exit: they "left the place in a mess".

"People tend to forget what happened in the 80s and how Pakistan suffered economically. Because of that… Pakistanis today are very uncomfortable with Americans basically using them as a launchpad and being on their territory."

Dr Lall is sympathetic to Mr Quereshi's calls for a more subtle approach to the problem than straightforward military intervention.

"I suspect that the troubles in the tribal areas would be a lot less if you didn't have American troops bombing and missiling there on a regular basis," she continued.

"A lot of this radicalisation which has happened is a response to what is seen as undue western influence on Islamabad, on Musharraf. The Islamisation drive is not only among militants – you will find privately that people say more and more that they [the extremists] are the only groups which are addressing the issue of American troops on Pakistani soil."

It's a staggering failure of policy from the Americans, who even funded and printed radical textbooks to persuade the Afghan youth to join the mujahideen. That irony led to the "Islamisation of the entire border area", Dr Lall says, but doesn't solve the growing question-mark on the ground at the moment. Is Mr Qureshi's stance acceptable to the west?

For now, the British government is keeping its mouth shut on the issue. A Foreign Office spokesperson said Pakistan's concerns about the "serious threat" from Fata were shared by Britain. "Work towards a "stable and secure" border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is necessary because of the "ability" of "insurgents" to cross it. The spokesperson meekly suggested Kabul and Islamabad "intensify their dialogue" to resolve their differences.

"We hope that the government of Pakistan's current efforts in the area will achieve success," the spokesperson added. It's a tentative response, but many – including Dr Lall – believe it is a shield for much greater backroom levels of "undue pressure" for military action behind the scenes.

Such support is misguided, she believes. The insurgency encountered by US forces in Iraq would, by comparison, "look like a walk in the park".

"There needs to be dialogue, a political solution. But I think we might have crossed the point of no return and that the radicalisation of troops is simply irreversible through talks."

It's a bleak prediction for the future of the region and is at odds with Mr Qureshi's optimism. Given the seriousness of the situation in Pakistan's tribal areas – the "epicentre of global terrorism", after all – Dr Lall's belief that the Pakistani government's balanced approach is doomed to failure is not good news. Even more gloomy warnings about the likely impacts of intensified military action mean, for now at least, there is no immediate solution to the region's apparently intractable problems.

Alex Stevenson