Comment: History repeating in North Korea?
North Korean missile test: Just part of the growing threat
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Friday, 29, May 2009 12:00
The past often finds inconvenient ways of repeating itself.
The nuclear brinksmanship North Korea is currently engaging in is reminiscent of past sabre-rattling, but bears the deadly precedent that this time it is clear North Korea can develop an independent nuclear arsenal, writes Charlie Sammut.
Despite the difficulty of making clear statements on the country due to the utter paucity of media sources, the past appears to be repeating itself in the limited range of North Korea's arsenal.
There is a real difference between producing nuclear fissile material capable of detonation (as North Korea just have) and manufacturing minutarised nuclear warheads capable of being attached to ICBMs or aircraft such as the Korean H-5 bombers: a difference that cannot, and should not, be underplayed. The two missile launches on Tuesday from Musudan-ri and Wonsan were short range and the country has had significant difficulties launching functioning ICBMs. While North Korea may have a small, short-range nuclear arsenal, it is still some way off one that could pose a real risk to countries in the EU and the US.
The real threat of this situation is two-fold: firstly, the potential for an attack on South Korea, and the potential for a de-stabilising nuclear arms race in the region - further undermining the coherence of an international response.
Could North Korea actually attack South Korea? The breaking of treaties with its southern neighbour is indication that this could be more than the strategic brinkmanship that Kim Jong-Il has specialised in, but their actions risk losing their only ally on the world stage.
China has frequently supported North Korea on the international stage, hoping to guarantee stability for the country, avoid war and ensure Chinese regional dominance. Whatever happens in the future, China will be central to it, but its patience appears to finally be running out with North Korea. Their recent actions, including unanimously supporting the UN Security Council resolution against North Korea, indicate they are no longer keen to have a silent nuclear partner on their doorstep, nor to accept the irrational extremes of the Kim Jong-Il's regime.
If the international community is serious about solving the North Korea dilemma, it must find the right way to re-assure China that, while maintaining its priorities in the area, supporting North Korea is no longer in their interest.
The ground for splitting the two apart is fertile.
The relationship between the two has always been fractious, dominated by ideological differences and mistrust. Pyongyang is aware of the instability of the relationship, with the International Crisis Group recently stating that "Pyongyang knows Beijing might not come to its defence again in war and fears that it would trade it off if it felt its national interest could benefit". This shred of self-awareness in the South Korean regime indicate that, hopefully, an attack on South Korea is unrealistic.
China wants a stable Korea, but equally it wants to avoid war: it is unlikely to support any form of military action by Pyongyang in the future, and Kim Jong-il cannot afford to antagonise the country responsible for 90 per cent of North Korea's oil demand, 80 per cent of consumer goods and 45 percent of its food. If forced to, China could effectively destroy the fabric of Pyongyang's economy and society.
The more realistic, and worrying, outcome is the catalysing effect these events may have on the region's fragile geopolitics.
Japan, Taiwan and South Korea have the capacity to rapidly develop nuclear arsenals and with it the potential for pre-emptive strikes, an already hotly debated topic in Japan. The detonation at Kilju may well light the fuse for an arms race across the region: an arms race that the international community simply cannot afford at present.
The motivation for these actions on the international stage are unclear; it appears to be a zero-sum situation for both North Korea and the international community.
Yet this lack of rationality is characteristic of the North Korean regime.
Kim's government has displayed a notable reticence for any form of external communication. Though they have frequently been to the negotiating table, just as frequently they have kicked their chair away, bringing the table crashing down. For many analysts, they are the ultimate imponderable.
The mistake many are making is viewing this situation in terms of its external resonance: externally it is not rational, but internally it appears to make a certain kind of warped sense.
The nature of an ultra-Stalinist state like North Korea is that foreign policy is the handmaiden of domestic politics. Everything that is done externally is done to reinforce control internally. Just as Stalin created Comecon as an isolated, united space through internal rhetoric and external action, so Kim has achieved the same in North Korea through his nuclear diplomacy.
These moves come at a crucial time in North Korea. After the worries about the health of Kim, which though ill-publicised in North Korea led to rumours among the populace and sparked a race for his successor, this is a powerful re-affirmation of his continued will to power: a statement of his intent to continue to the lifeblood of the North Korean body politic.
Indeed analysts from the Brookings Institute believe that the detonation was designed to calm the race to succeed Kim Il-sung, a defiant call that the old man was not done, and moreover would leave on his own terms.
Despite this, what cannot be ignored are the new capabilities of the North Koreans, nor the fact that an incoherent response will allow the regime valuable time to progress a deterrent capable of buffering it from external actions.
The newly discovered capacity and recycled rhetoric of Pyongyang creates a worrying precedent for the world, and that world is anxious to see the response of the international community.
The worst-case scenario is that the brinksmanship we see may take the form of a new Cuban missile crisis, but with a silent partner. In this case, we must hope that the knot of war Khrushchev once talked about is not pulled tightly from both ends.
The international community must tread carefully, but decisively, so that history does not repeat itself once more.
Charlie Sammut