Opinion: Musharraf's disastrous legacy
Monday, 18 Aug 2008 14:12

What next for Islamabad and Pakistan?
Pakistan In Focus
Pervez Musharraf's resignation leaves a big hole in Pakistani politics – one which analysts expect the west will look to the military to fill. Full Story
Pervez Musharraf leaves Pakistan's domestic and foreign policies hopelessly tangled up as he exits political life after nine years in power.
His support for the US-led war on terror, and specifically the 2001 ousting of the Taliban from power in neighbouring Afghanistan, has led to the widespread belief among Pakistanis that his country has kowtowed to the Americans.
President Musharraf, who also headed Pakistan's military until November 2007, was forced to balance his commitment against extremism with the practical difficulties of dealing with an entire region widely sympathetic with the Taliban's aims.
He faced criticism, on the one hand, for failing to confront these groups. Many of those serving in Afghanistan blamed the Taliban's ability to regroup in the mountainous border region of Waziristan for the lack of security progress there. Could Gen Musharraf do more? Should he have allowed western forces into Pakistan to help out? Was he really committed to the fight against extremism?
Such pressures built as public opinion in Pakistan changed drastically. Real concern has grown about the presence of American forces in a region of the world where they are simply not welcome. Only the radical groups were deemed to be addressing this issue – and a social conservatism crept in which was not present before Gen Musharraf's 1999 coup.
How could Gen Musharraf cope with these pressures? He did not. His treatment of the Red Mosque debacle - in which the army was bluntly deployed to crush the radicals - directly contributed to the outbreak of bombings and killings which led to the present crisis. His battle with chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhry hardly helped. And the least said the better about the state of emergency which bought him a few more months in power and mortgaged international support. His entire presidency had an air of the knee-jerk about it – Pervez Musharraf responded to events, rather than shaped them.
When those events included September 11th 2001, of course, it should be said that any leader can be excused for not being fully in control of the situation. And it is true that the problem of radicalism in Pakistan – which has contributed so much to its current climate of crisis – goes back far beyond 1999. History speaks for itself and the US' interference in Pakistan's affairs has a long history. Its cold war support for the mujahideen insurgency in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union was utterly divisive. Pakistan suffered economically as a result. The Americans, it was popularly felt, used Pakistan and then left when it suited their interests. There was no reconstruction, no repayments. Given the hand dealt to him, you could argue, Gen Musharraf would always have difficulty placating the anti-US sentiment of his people.
It is a shame, therefore, that he played that hand so poorly. Ex-president Musharraf exacerbated the problems that already existed. His obsession with clinging to power made matters worse. And his military instincts led to the smashing fist when more delicate strategies would have worked better. Mr Musharraf's presidency began with crisis; it has certainly ended that way. It is not yet clear whether his rivals can unite to begin the healing process after his disastrous nine years in power.
Alex Stevenson